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INTRODUCTION
Susan Bandes*
In his keynote address to the Race to Execution Symposium on
which these articles are based, Bryan Stevenson spoke for many of us
who work for reform in the death penalty context when he said: "I
have not yet recovered from reading the McCleskey decision."' He
was deeply troubled by the Court's "fear of too much justice" 2-its
claim that it could not acknowledge racial bias in the capital context
because it would then have to deal with racial bias in other criminal
contexts as well. But, he went on:
It was the second thing the Court said that broke my heart, that did
something to me that I'm still trying to recover from. The second
thing the Court said was a certain amount of bias, a certain quantum
of discrimination ... is in the Court's opinion inevitable.... And so
we are gathered in this room talking about race and the death pen-
alty while the United States Supreme Court has already said it's
pointless for [us] to be here.3
We gathered together to discuss a problem the Supreme Court has
essentially written off as inevitable and intractable. To further compli-
cate matters, the very invocation of the topic of racial injustice is in-
creasingly regarded as suspect, both in the courts and elsewhere-as
accusatory and, through a kind of looking-glass logic, racially divisive.
The aversion to discussing race extends not merely to reaching conclu-
sions or identifying problems, 4 but even to seeking information about
the extent to which those problems exist.5 In this context, so inhospi-
table not only to achieving the ideal of racial justice, but even to
* Distinguished Research Professor, DePaul University College of Law.
1. McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279 (1987); Bryan Stevenson, Keynote Address at DePaul
University College of Law's Race to Execution Symposium (Oct. 24, 2003), in 53 DEPAUL L.
REV. 1699, 1706 (2004).
2. McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 339; Stevenson, supra note 1, at 1706.
3. Stevenson, supra note 1, at 1706.
4. For an excellent discussion of this issue, see Donna Coker, Addressing the Real World of
Racial Injustice in the Criminal Justice System, 93 Nw. J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY, 827, 827
(2003) (describing courts' assumption of a raceless society in criminal procedure cases). See also
RANDALL KENNEDY, RACE, CRIME, AND THE LAW 336-38 (1997). ("Powell's McCleskey opinion
was haunted by anxiety over the consequences of acknowledging candidly the large influence of
racial sentiment in the administration of capital punishment in Georgia.").
5. See, e.g., The Constitution Project, Mandatory Justice: Eighteen Reforms to the Death Pen-
alty 57, at http://www.constitutionproject.org/dpi/MandatoryJustice.pdf (last visited Apr. 6, 2004)
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broaching the topic, what are the proper goals and strategies for a
conference on race and the death penalty?
As the speakers at this powerful and galvanizing conference empha-
sized again and again, and as the articles in this issue so articulately
explain, it is necessary to break free of a number of anachronistic con-
straints in order to effectively name and tackle the problem. Any
strategy focused solely on litigation, or on convincing the courts, will
have limited efficacy. For lawyers and legal academics, this means
that our most familiar and comfortable avenue of attack is simply no
longer adequate. For academics, it is also necessary to avoid the pit-
falls of territoriality-questions of racial justice are too complex and
wide ranging to respect academic subject areas or unhelpful distinc-
tions between the theoretical and the practical.
Even figuring out the right questions turns out to be a wholly col-
laborative and interdisciplinary endeavor. What is the face of racial
injustice today? Has it changed over the years? At what junctures in
the system does it reside, and where and how is it best attacked?
What information do we have on these questions, and what remains to
be discovered? Criminal law scholarship has been famously insular
and thus, in many respects, poorly suited to address these questions.
It has tended not to connect to other areas of legal scholarship,6 and it
has tended, like much of legal scholarship, to eschew the empirical.
Again like much of legal scholarship, it has resisted the insights of
other disciplines. Thus a field that is concerned with areas of human
behavior such as jury decision making, the role of victims, and the
purposes of punishment has been, until recently, remarkably uninter-
ested in the lessons of psychology, anthropology, or emotion theory.7
The articles that follow in this Symposium issue model an approach
that crosses disciplinary and methodological boundaries and bridges
divisions between abolition and reform, theory and practice, lay and
professional. The synergies among these areas enabled participants to
examine the capital punishment system as a whole, as a series of inter-
locking systems, as a dynamic among numerous actors and the larger
society within which they operate, and, most of all, as an institution
with power over the fates of people: victims, survivors, defendants,
lawyers, judges, and jurors. Those who attended the Symposium came
(dissenting statement of Timothy Lynch to recommendation calling for collection of statistics on
the role of race in capital punishment).
6. AKHIL AMAR, THE CONSTITUTION AND CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: FIRST PRINCIPLES 115
(1997); Susan Bandes, Taking Some Rights Too Seriously: The State's Right to a Fair Trial, 60 S.
CAL. L. REV. 1019, 1020-21, 1053 (1987); Susan Bandes, "We the People" and Our Enduring
Values, 96 MICH. L. REV. 1376, 1376 (1998).
7. Susan A. Bandes, Introduction to THE PASSIONS OF LAW 1, 2 (Susan A. Bandes ed., 1999).
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away with the sense of a shared community of interest, focused on a
daunting but not insoluble problem, composed of people who have
already made a tremendous difference, and intend to continue to do
so.
Starting from the shared assumption that race discrimination in the
American system of capital punishment is unacceptable, the Sympo-
sium embarked on an exploration of what we already know about the
role of race in that system, what we still need to learn, and how we can
act on the knowledge we possess. Assumptions about race, it becomes
clear, affect every aspect of the criminal process, including who gets
charged, who gets a break, who gets to plead, who gets a good lawyer,
how that lawyer interacts with his or her client, how the jury and judge
see the defendant, how the jury deliberates, how the case is presented
in the media and understood by the public, and, of course, who gets
sentenced to death. More accurately, as Craig Haney eloquently re-
minds us, the "point at which the criminal justice system directly inter-
venes in the lives of African Americans ... occurs long after some of
the most potent and destructive racialized forces at work in our soci-
ety have already taken their life-altering toll. '" 8
The first task is to gain a more complex and focused understanding
of the junctures at which racial variables enter and skew the system.
One theme that quickly emerged was that studying the criminal justice
system without regard for its larger societal context would not be pro-
ductive. The death penalty, as an institution generally, and in terms of
its implementation, is peculiarly susceptible to the influence of socie-
tal attitudes on multiple levels. Attitudes shape implementation at a
number of crucial junctures-legislative, prosecutorial, and adjudica-
tive, for example. 9 More generally, deeply ingrained assumptions
about race will affect the dynamics of the process in ways the law is
both ill-equipped and highly reluctant to identify.10
The black box of prosecutorial charging decisions has always
presented a formidable challenge in this regard. Both Kevin McNally
and Rory Little closely examine the available data on charging deci-
8. Craig Haney, Condemning the Other in Death Penalty Trials: Biographical Racism, Struc-
tural Mitigation, and the Empathic Divide, 53 DEPAUL L. REV. 1557, 1561 (2004).
9. Susan Bandes, Fear Factor: The Role of Media in Covering and Shaping the Death Penalty, 1
OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. (forthcoming 2004) (on file with author).
10. For example, Professor James Liebman and his coauthors, in their groundbreaking study,
A Broken System, found a significant correlation between the African-American population of a
jurisdiction and its rate of serious error in capital cases. See James S. Liebman et al., A Broken
System Part 11: Why There Is So Much Error in Capital Cases and What Can Be Done About It
(Feb. 11, 2002), at http://www2.law.columbia.edu/brokensystem2/index2.html (last visited Apr.
24, 2004).
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sions in federal capital cases. The federal system presents the ques-
tion of whether a race-blind charging system is possible, and McNally
and Little are in disagreement on this point.1" However, a deeper
question underlies that one: Is a race-blind system, at least in current
circumstances, even a worthy goal? McNally argues that such a sys-
tem would make it impossible to take cognizance of and address the
disparities that will, inevitably, continue to exist.12 Rory Little sheds
light on the prosecutorial process in an additional, valuable way, by
providing a window into the prosecutorial psyche. He suggests that
prosecutors tend to view their cases individually rather than systemi-
cally. When convinced that a particular defendant is worthy of a
death sentence, they are unlikely to accept arguments of broader sys-
temic inequality as relevant to that decision.13
Overt racial bias is rarely the demon to be slain, either in the
prosecutorial context or elsewhere in the system. It is the covert, or
unconscious, biases and assumptions that need to be addressed. 14 In
light of this reality, Little quite rightly suggests the need for more
study of the dynamics of race bias. Several of these articles explore
this terrain and also map out directions for further study.
David Baldus, who has contributed so much to our knowledge
about the precise shape of racial discrimination in capital cases, re-
minds us here to be attentive to the evolving forms of discrimination.
As he sensibly points out, naming the problem accurately is a neces-
sary predicate to dealing with it. His article draws on his recent em-
pirical research on this topic and the related topic of how accurately
the public perceives the problem. He contends that the early forms of
discrimination in capital cases, which were largely dependent on the
race of the defendant, are no longer significant problems. He finds
that the public (at least the attentive public) correctly perceives the
decline in race-of-defendant discrimination. However, the race-of-vic-
tim discrimination flagged in his groundbreaking Baldus study15 re-
mains a significant factor in sentencing disparities. He states that
"race-of-victim discrimination is both unconstitutional and immoral"
11. See Kevin McNally, Race and the Federal Death Penalty: A Nonexistent Problem Gets
Worse, 53 DEPAUL L. REV. 1615 (2004); Rory K. Little, What Federal Prosecutors Really Think:
The Puzzle of Statistical Race Disparity Versus Specific Guilt, and the Specter of Timothy Mc-
Veigh, 53 DEPAUL L. REV. 1591 (2004).
12. McNally, supra note 11.
13. Little, supra note 11.
14. See Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with Un-
conscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317, 321 (1987) (discussing difficulties with purposeful dis-
crimination requirement). See generally Sheri Lynn Johnson, Unconscious Racism and the
Criminal Law, 73 CORNELL L. REV. 1016 (1988).
15. For judicial description of the Baldus study, see McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 286-89.
[Vol. 53:14031406
INTRODUCTION
and contends that the execution of many offenders, who would be
serving terms of life imprisonment but for the race of their victim,
seriously impairs the legitimacy of the death penalty systems in which
it exists. 16 As to this more subtle form of discrimination, he finds the
general public unaware of it. More problematic, perhaps, is his find-
ing that the attentive public is aware of it but divided, not only about
its pervasiveness, but about its morality. As he rightly argues, public
perception of the way the punishment works, and of its legitimacy, is
crucial to reform efforts. It will affect not only strategies for reform,
but also the approach of those who make, apply, and enforce the
law.17 His message is ultimately hopeful: the problem of race-of-vic-
tim discrimination is less pervasive and more amenable to correction
than the race-of-defendant discrimination that once plagued the
system.
Raymond Brown also focuses on the importance of public percep-
tion and our duty to address it. Public perception inevitably shapes
and reflects juror perception; and juror perception on issues like what
counts as mitigation or who poses future danger, for example, will af-
fect juror deliberations on core issues of guilt and sentencing. As
Brown illustrates with his comparison of the coverage of the "Beltway
Sniper" cases with that of the "American Taliban" case, media cover-
age of the death penalty is heavily influenced, and indeed distorted, by
the race of those covered. He suggests that these media distortions
both reflected and helped shape the conduct of the judicial proceed-
ings in these cases. Thus, reformers who limit their efforts to the nar-
rowly defined legal arena at the expense of the broader arena of
public opinion do so at their clients' peril.
Bill Bowers and Marla Sandys18 present recent findings from the
Capital Jury Project (CJP) that continue their important work19 of
delving into the black box of the jury room. Specifically, the authors
looked at jury dynamics, how they are affected by racial composition
16. David C. Baldus & George Woodworth, Race Discrimination and the Legitimacy of Capi-
tal Punishment: Reflections on the Interaction of Fact and Perception, 53 DEPAUL L. REV. 1411,
1414, Part III (2004).
17. Based on Kevin McNally's examination of the current Justice Department, a similar dy-
namic may operate at the federal administrative level; McNally found that the current adminis-
tration has ignored or blurred the race-of-victim issue. McNally, supra note 11.
18. Bowers and Sandys presented their paper at the Symposium. It was written in conjunction
with a third author, Tom Brewer of Kent State University.
19. See, e.g., William J. Bowers et al., Death Sentencing in Black and White: An Empirical
Analysis of the Role of Jurors' Race and Jury Racial Composition, 3 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 171, 260
(2001) (reporting findings that, in juries studied, whites were more likely than blacks to see black
defendants as dangerous to society in the future and as likely to get back on the streets if not
sentenced to death).
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of the jury, and the implications of these dynamics for the capital sen-
tencing process. Bowers and Sandys found that the racial composition
of the jury had a significant effect on the likelihood of a death sen-
tence, with a dominance of white males on the jury strongly correlated
with imposition of a capital sentence.20 The findings are significant on
many levels. They provide a window into the jurors' understanding
(or lack thereof) of the meaning of a bifurcated trial in which a deci-
sion on guilt must precede a decision on punishment. In short, atti-
tudes toward guilt and punishment often seem inextricably
intertwined. Moreover, the jurors' perception of the crucial aspects of
the defendant's presentation relevant to both guilt and sentencing,
such as the defendant's demeanor, level of remorse or arrogance, fu-
ture dangerousness or rehabilitative potential, or the strength of miti-
gating evidence, was found to vary widely depending on the jurors'
race. The CJP findings (which are preliminary-the authors plan to
continue to gather data on these issues) reaffirm the importance of
acknowledging racial variables and their effect on the core functions
of the capital jury. Unfortunately, the CJP also found that this very
acknowledgement is lacking: juries and judges are deeply reluctant to
recognize or deal with issues of race in the jury room, or in the rela-
tionship between jury and defendant. 21 Yet, as their findings along-
side those of David Baldus make clear, these issues will not go away
for being ignored, and they will not stay neatly cabined in doctrinal
categories like "mitigation" or "future dangerousness."
Craig Haney's analysis of the "empathic divide" and its effects on
the administration of capital punishment continues his important
work on the deeply pernicious psychological effects of racial inequal-
ity in the capital context. His analysis for the Symposium beautifully
complements the work of Baldus, Bowers, and Sandys, and once again
underscores the necessity of bringing together diverse disciplinary
perspectives. Haney traces the myriad structurally determined obsta-
cles that cause the disproportionate number of minority defendants in
the criminal justice system.22 He then illustrates, with reference to
psychological theory and his own research, the fatal inability of the
current system of mitigation to take account of this "biographical
racism. " 23
20. William J. Bowers et al., Crossing Racial Boundaries: A Closer Look at the Roots of Racial
Bias in Capital Sentencing When the Defendant is Blank and the Victim in White, 53 DEPAUL L.
REV. 1497 (2004).
21. McNally, supra note 11.
22. Haney, supra note 8.
23. Id. at 1557.
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Andrea Lyon's article faces this issue head on, and with highly use-
ful pragmatism. Lyon draws on her broad experience in capital cases
to address the ways in which defense attorneys can talk to jurors
about race.24 She emphasizes the importance of acknowledging the
issue. Her talk, like so much of the Symposium, emphasizes the futil-
ity of separating the legal, practical, and emotional aspects of capital
lawyering. She advises that it is essential to explore which potential
jurors are open to hearing mitigation evidence, and to attempt to
identify those who are not. While exploring this uncomfortable topic,
the lawyer must establish a rapport with the jury and set the stage for
a conversation that will occur throughout the guilt and penalty phases
of the trial. As she emphasized, setting the stage to talk openly about
race is essential whether the issue appears salient or not.
Sheri Lynn Johnson and Ted Eisenberg explore a rarely discussed
aspect of the problem of racial attitudes: the extent to which these
attitudes affect defense attorneys and the representation they provide.
As they point out, because the defense bar is usually the source of
inquiry about racial bias, scrutiny of defense bias is unlikely. It is,
however, crucially important because it affects the attorney-client
bond, the ability to choose and direct experts and to understand miti-
gation, and other essential strategic and legal choices.2 5 Their empiri-
cal research on the topic of unconscious bias among defense attorneys
is fascinating and affirms what ought not be surprising: despite their
ideological commitment, defense attorneys are not exempt from per-
vasive attitudes about race.
The Symposium articles that follow, coupled with the transcripts of
two eloquently moving speeches-Bryan Stevenson's luncheon ad-
dress and the closing remarks of former Illinois Governor George
Ryan-convey some sense of the spirit of collaborative inquiry that
pervaded the Race to Execution Symposium. In addition, they pro-
vide an important step in the ongoing interdisciplinary effort to iden-
tify, address, and ultimately eradicate racially-biased capital
punishment.
24. Andrea D. Lyon, Naming the Dragon: Litigating Race Issues During a Death Penalty Trial,
53 DEPAUL L. REV. 1647 (2004).
25. Theodore Eisenberg & Sheri Lynn Johnson, Implicit Racial Attitudes of Death Penalty
Lawyers, 53 DEPAUL L. REV. 1539 (2004).
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